Introduction
This Appendix provides several versions of the overlapping generations model (OLG) and representative agent (RA) model considered in the main text. Besides the details of the respective model we also present further results to check the robustness of our findings.
If not mentioned otherwise the definition of the variables follows the one in the main text.
The next section gives a detailed account of the demographic structure which underlies our OLG model. Section 
Demographic Structure

S1
In our model periods correspond to quarters. In each period there are T generations alive. They work the first R − 1 periods of their life and retire at age R. The size of each generation s is ψ s . A member of generation s survives with probability φ s to age s + 1 so that the mass of generation s + 1 is given by ψ s+1 = φ s ψ s .
(1) A_Mass
We normalize the total mass T s=1 ψ s to unity.
We calibrate the survival rates from the age-specific death rates for the total population in the US in the year 2000. Linear interpolation between the annual survival rates for the 20 through 79 year old population provides the quarterly rates. We assume that all members of the first generation s = 1 survive and that all members of the last generation s = 240 die. Figure   Fig1 1 displays the survival rates (before normalization). The dots correspond to the annual survival rates from Arias (2002) .
Each generation s consists of m different productivity groups of mass ν h , m h=1 ν h = 1. Each new born agent is assigned to one of these groups and remains in this group during his lifetime. His productivity ǫ s,h = e s z h has an age and an individual specific 
Fig1
component, e s and z h , respectively. We use the age specific productivity profile from Hansen (1993) and interpolate linearly to obtain a quarterly series. Figure   Fig2 2 displays this profile. The dots correspond to Hansen's (1993) data for the 21 through 60 year old workers. The quarterly rates are normalized so that average productivity equals unity.
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We assume that the group specific productivity z h is log-normally distributed around the age s = 1 mean productivity with standard deviation σ z . We approximate this distribution at m equally spaced points, choose σ z so as to match the empirically observed Gini ratio of income, and normalize the weights so that 
OLG Version of the Stochastic Growth Model
SGM
Our first model most closely resembles the stochastic growth model. There are three sectors: households, firms, and the government. We describe them in turn.
Households
The household sector consists of T × m different types of agents with mass ψ s ν h as described in Section S1 2. Agents that die at the end of period t leave bequests. We assume that the government confiscates all bequests. Section PFA 3.5 deals with perfect annuity markets.
At at calendar time t an agent of age s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }, who belongs to productivity group h ∈ 1, 2, . . . , m, maximizes his expected life-time utility c t j ,s,h = (1 − τ ) e j z h w t j n + (r t j − δ)k t j ,s,h + ω t j ,s,h + pens t j ,s,h + trs t j + k t j ,s,h − k t j +1,s+1,h , e j = 0 for j = R, R + 1, . . . , T, pens t j ,s,h = 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , R − 1, k t j ,s,h = 0 for j = 1, k t j +1,s+1,h = 0 for j = T, t j := t + j − s.
(3) BC0 c t j ,s,h denotes his consumption, n his exogenously given supply of working hours, w t j and r t j denote the wage rate and the interest rate, respectively, δ is rate at which physical capital depreciates, k t j ,s,h are the agent's assets, τ is the tax rate, ω t j ,s,h is profit income, trs t j are lump sum government transfers, and pens t j ,s,h denotes pensions which are paid to retired agents. Note that variables without index t j , s, or h are assumed to be constant across time, age, or productivity group, respectively.
We assume that aggregate profits Ω t are distributed to households according to their shares in aggregate wealth. Yet, because younger households may find it optimal to lend against future income, we restrict the distribution to households with positive assets. Furthermore, since our solution procedure (log-linearization at the balanced growth path) cannot deal with abrupt changes from negative to positive wealth, we use the shares that apply in the stationary equilibrium of our model. Thus, the shares of aggregate profits Ω t received by a household of age s and productivity type h equal
This guarantees that the shares ad up to unity.
Pensions are proportional to the average net wage income received by working agents in group h in the stationary equilibrium:
pens where ζ is the replacement rate.
At time t the first-order conditions of all living agents of type h consist of their respective budget constraint (
BC0
3) at j = s and the following 2T − 1 equations:
where λ t,s,h is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint at time t for the agent of age s and of productivity type h.
On a balanced growth path, wages, interest rates, profits, bequests, transfers and pensions are constant, and individual variables only depend on age s and type h but not on calendar time t. In this case the system of 3T − 1 equations (
) and ( FOC1 6) can be reduced to the following system of linear equations in the
Production
Psector There are two sectors of production. The final good Y t is assembled from a unit mass of differentiated goods Y t (j), j ∈ [0, 1] according to
Profit maximization implies the demand functions:
and the price index
pindex where P t (j) denotes the nominal price of good j.
Each of the differentiated goods j is produced according to the production function
Intermed where the Z t denotes a productivity shock, whose unconditional expectation equals Z = 1. Off the balanced growth path the log of Z t is governed by
A_Shock where ǫ Z t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ Z . Without any nominal frictions each intermediate goods producer chooses his optimal relative price P t (j)/P t . In the symmetric equilibrium the relative price of all producers equals unity, individual output Y t (j) equals aggregate production Y t and the equilibrium in the markets for labor and capital services implies
where aggregate labor and capital equal
N and 
A_Omega where
Government
The government uses its tax income
and aggregate bequests Beq t to finance pensions,
Pens the purchase of goods G t , and distributes any remaining funds lump sum to households. Thus, aggregate transfers (which equal individual transfers due to the unit mass of households) are given by
Note that given the factor market equilibrium conditions ( 
(21) Tax2
Aggregate Bequests
We are now in the position to derive a consistent definition of aggregate bequests from the flow budget constraints that we have specified so far. Aggregating over the budget constraints ( 
In order to add up to the resource constraint
the rightmost term on the last line of this equation must equal Beq t + K t+1 . Since K t+1 can be written as
this implies:
(23) A_Bequests 3.5 Perfect Annuity Markets
PFA
As an alternative to the treatment of bequests in the previous section assume that each generation s can insure against sudden death in period t. While alive, a member of generation s receives insurance payments of (1 − φ s )k t+1,s+1,h . Should he die at the end of age s, the insurance company receives his assets k t+1,s+1,h . Given perfect insurance markets, aggregate payments of insurance premia amount to
which equals aggregate bequests as defined in equation ( A_Bequests 23). In this case, the budged constraints of generations s = 1, . . . , R − 1 are given by
where k t,1,s = 0. For generations s = R, . . . , T − 1 the budget constraints are
Since all members of generation T die with probability one, the budget constraint of these agents is
Aggregation of the budget constraints over all generations and all productivity types yields the economy's resource constraint,
since the terms φ s k t+1,s+1,h aggregate to K t+1 .
With perfect annuity markets the coefficients of the matrix A = (a ij ) in ( Sys1 7) must be changed to:
The left-hand side vector does not change.
Calibration
The calibration follows the one in Section 3 of the main paper. Table   Pars1 1 summarizes our parameter choice for Model 1. 
Stationary Equilibrium
We compute the stationary equilibrium in two steps. In the first step we assume that profits are distributed in equal shares to all households. Given initial values of N (from ( N 14)), K, and Beq we can infer w and r from ( We use the asset shares κ s,h implied by this solution as initial values for a system of non-linear equations in (K, Beq, κ s,h ). The solution of this system in 2T + 2 variables is the stationary solution of Model 1. Figure   Fig3 3 displays the age profiles of wealth, disposable income, and consumption in the case of m = 3 productivity groups, m = 3, and ξ = 0, for both the model with perfect 
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annuity markets and the model where the government confiscates bequests. The model with perfect annuity markets implies that consumption increases monotonically with age in almost the same manner as in a model with deterministic life time. Since the hump shaped consumption-age profile is more in accordance with empirical evidence, we restrict further attention to the latter model.
Endogenous Labor Supply and Progressive Taxation
ELS
In this section we add labor supply and progressive taxation of market income to the model of Section SGM 3. We refer to this extended framework as Model 2.
The Tax Schedule
CTS
Gouveira and Stauss (1994) characterize the US effective income tax in the year 1989 with the function and estimate its parameters as a 0 = 0.258, a 1 = 0.786, and a 2 = 0.031. We must adjust this function to our model, since we assume quarterly tax payments and since the units of income y in our model differ from those in the US. We assume that the average tax rate on an annual income equals the average tax rate on quarterly income, and that the average tax rate in our model equals the average tax rate on the average US income in 1989, y us :
Solving this equation forã 2 yields our adjusted tax schedule:
Note, that the average income y in our model depends itself on the tax schedule. Therefore, we must adjustã 2 in each step of our iterative computation of the stationary equilibrium until convergence is achieved.
Given the tax function ( A_TF1 29), aggregate taxes equal
where y t,s,h is the taxable income of household (s, h), which we define in the next subsection.
Households
We include leisure 1 − n t,s,h additively separably in the instantaneous utility function of the households. At calendar time t an agent of age s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }, who belongs to productivity group h ∈ 1, 2, . . . , m, maximizes his expected life-time utility
subject to the sequence of budget constraints j = s, s + 1, . . . , T :
At time t the first-order conditions of all living agents of age s and type h consist of their respective budget constraint and the following 2T + R − 2 equations:
where λ t,s,h is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint at time t for the s quarter old agent of productivity type h.
Calibration
We choose η 0 so that average working hours
in the model of Section
Mod3 5 are 0.33. This requires two different setting, depending on ξ ∈ {0, 1}. The value of η = 7 implies a conservative estimate of the Frisch labor supply elasticity of 0.3. The remaining parameters are equal to those displayed in Table   Pars1 1 and are summarized in Table   Pars2 2. Figure   Fig4 4 displays the age profile of wealth, disposable income, consumption, and working hours. The broken lines correspond to the solution of model, if the tax schedule is linear with rate τ = 0.104. This is the same tax rate that we used in Section 
Stationary Equilibrium
3.
The lower right panel of Figure   Fig4 4 displays the age-profile of labor supply. Remember from Figure   Fig2 2 that during the first 30 years of working life all types of agents face an upward sloping age-productivity profile. Despite this, the lower right panel of Figure   Fig4 4 shows that the age-profile of labor supply is almost flat during the first 10 years and then starts to decline for all types of agents due to the negative wealth effect on labor supply. Since the low-productivity worker receive a large share of their Wenn Du
income as government transfers, they supply less labor than the medium productivity workers (compare the black to the blue lines). The negative impact of the tax progression on labor supply declines with the agents' level of productivity. Nevertheless, low and medium productivity workers accumulate more wealth under the progressive tax system, whereas the high productivity workers save significantly less.
Log-Linearization
LLMod2
To compute the model's business cycle dynamics we log-linearize it at the stationary solution as described in Heer and Maußner (2009a) 
The vector x t consists of the (percentage deviations of) variables with given initial conditions. In our model, this is the m(T − 1)-vector of capital stocks
The vector λ t summarizes variables which are also predetermined at time t but whose initial values must be chosen so as to satisfy the model's transversality conditions. The vector u t holds all remaining variables of the model, which are determined given x t , λ t , and the vector of shocks z t .
Equations ( ll1 35) can be reduced to
In some versions of our model the matrix B is not invertible, since it is not always obvious which variables are costate rather than control variables, i.e., for which no static equations -as in ( ll1a 35a) -are available. Instead of doing tedious linear algebra to figure this out, we used the generalized Schur factorization to solve the system ( BAC 36) for the linear policy functions
as explained in Heer and Maußner (2009b) .
In the linearized version of Model 2 the vector x t is composed of the percentage deviations of the individual capital stocksk t,s,h :
The variables in λ t correspond to the percentage deviations of the m(T − 1) Lagrange multipliers of generations s = 1 through s = T − 1:
The multipliers of generation s = T , λ t,T,h , are determined via the budget constraint of this generation and, thus, are control rather than costate variables. The vector u t is composed of the mT -vector of percentage deviations of consumption,
the m-vector
the mT -vector
the mT -vector of the percentage deviations of disposable incomê
where
(38) yd and the following variables:
Aggregate working hours H t are defined as
We first derive the set of equations ( ll1a 35a). The log-linearized definitions of market income y t,s,h are 
The definitions of disposable income imply:
The log-linearized first-order conditions with respect to consumption and labor are:
The m log-linearized budget constraints of generation T yield:
The log-linear factor market equilibrium conditions are:
The log-linearized aggregate production function (
The log-linearized definitions of aggregate labor input N t , aggregate hours H t , the aggregate capital stock K t , aggregate consumption C t , and aggregate tax income T ax t are:
The log-linearized definition of aggregate profits (
The log-linearized aggregate resource constraint Y t = C t + I t + G t yields an equation for the percentage deviation of aggregate investment I t from its steady state value I = δK:
follows from our definition that aggregate government spending is equal to a fraction ξ of government income (taxes and bequests) minus pensions P ens. Since pensions are independent of time and T rs t = (1 − ξ)(T ax t + Beq t − P ens),
Log-linearizing ( A_Bequests 23) and substituting fork t+1,s+1,h from the household's budget constraints yields an equation that determines the percentage change of bequests:
The dynamic equations ( 
and the latter are given by h = 1, . . . , m :
A Representative Agent Version of Model 2
If we want to understand in which way the overlapping generations structure changes the business cycle dynamics of the economy we must separate its influence from other features of our model. For this reason we also consider a representative agent version of the model in this subsection.
The representative household maximizes
The production sector is the same as in Section The first-order conditions for the household's problem are
The log-linearized model is:
Equations ( 
is the log-linearized definition of government expenditures on goods, G t = ξ(τ (Y t − δK t ). Figure   IMod2 5 displays the response of both the OLG and the representative agent (RA) model to a technology shock in period t = 2. The most obvious difference between the two models concerns the response of hours, which is positive in the RA model and negative in the OLG model. In the latter model the increase in transfer payments creates a strong negative income effect on the low productivity workers which outweighs the positive substitution effect of higher wages. 
Impulse Response
Households
To motivate the holdings of money in our model we include the stock of real money balances in the current period utility functions of households. We refer to this extended model as Model 3. Let x t,s,h denote the stock of nominal money balances owned by the s year old household of productivity type h. For convenience, we set up the model in terms of the real value of the beginning-of-period money balances m t,s,h := x t,s,h /P t−1 . π t := P t /P t−1 denotes the inflation factor between the previous and the current quarter t.
At period t the expected life-time utility of household (s, h) is:
To make this definition meaningful for the newborn agents without wealth, we assume that these agents receive a cash transfer from the government that equals the real beginning-of-period money balances of the one quarter older agents.
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In the sequence of budget constraints ( BC1 32) we must change the definition of consumption to include the real, end-of-period money balances m t,j,h /π t and the next-period real value of wealth held in terms of money m t+1,j+1,h . The other equations are still valid:
pens j,h = 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , R − 1,
n t,s,h = 0 for j = R, . . . , T,
At time t the first-order conditions for maximizing ( ltu2 44) subject to ( BC2 45) of all living agents of type h consist of their respective budget constraints and the following 3(T − 3 In a previous version of the model we assumed that the cash transfer equals 21 percent of the average disposable income of the first generation, a value that corresponds to the average cash holdings of the 21-year-old households in the 1994 PSID survey. However, this value is far below the money holdings chosen by the one quarter older agents in our model, implying a huge, empirically implausible jump between the money holdings at s = 1 and at s = 2.
4 For the newborn generation j = 1 we assume that they receive m t,1,h as money transfer from the government so that m t,1,h rather than m t,s,h /π t appears on the rhs of the budget constraint of this generation.
1) + R equations:
5 FOC7 s = 1, . . . , T : 
Monetary Authority
The aggregate stock of nominal money balances held by households of ages s = 2 through T equals
The monetary authority imperfectly monitors the growth rate (θ t − 1) of this aggregate and transfers the seignorage Seign t to the government. Thus:
A_MGrowth
The percentage deviation of θ t from its non-stochastic mean θ followŝ
Our definition of M t together with the assumptions regarding monetary policy imply a dynamic equation in the aggregate real beginning-of period money stock:
A_Mt2 5 We simplified the first-order conditions with respect to m t+1,s+1,h by using ( FOC7a 46a). This delivered equation ( FOC7d 46d).
Government
Real government expenditures in period t consists of pensions P ens t , the money endowment of the first generation, m h=1 ψ 1 ν h m t,1,h government consumption G t , and lump-sum transfers T rs t to households. They are financed by the income tax defined in equation ( A_Tax3 30), confiscated bequests Beq t , and seignorage:
To derive the economy's resource constraint from aggregation over the budget constraints of the households, the definition of bequests in ( A_Bequests 23) must be changed to include the wealth stored in real money holdings:
We continue to assume that government consumption of goods is a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of government income minus payments for pensions and money transfers to generation s = 1:
The model is closed by adding the production sector described in Section Psector 3.2.
Calibration
CalMod3
In the stationary equilibrium of the deterministic version of Model 3 the inflation factor π equals the non-stochastic mean of the quarterly growth rate θ. We employ θ = 1.013 from Cooley and Hansen (1995) . We also take the estimates of the AR(1)-process ( Growthfactor 51) from these authors: ρ θ = 0.49 and σ θ = 0.0089. We choose the parameter γ so that the annualized average velocity of money P Y /X in stationary equilibrium of our model equals the average velocity of M1 during 1960-2002 in the US of 6. Since this result depends upon our choice of ξ ∈ {0, 1}, we introduce a superscript index from {0, 1} for the parameter γ, i.e. γ 0 and γ 1 . The value of β = 0.9975 implies an annual capital-output-ratio of about 2.0, which is almost independent of our choice of ξ. The productivity of the two types of agents is chosen so that the Gini ratio of market income is 0.55. This implies σ x = 3.6 irrespective of the value of ξ. The value of δ = 0.019 implies an annual investment-capital ratio of 0.076 and is taken from Cooley and Prescott (1995) . η Cooley and Prescott (1995) . Table   Pars3 3 summarizes our parameter choice for Model 3. Figure   Fig7 6 displays the age profiles of capital, real money balances, disposable income, consumption and working hours. The effect of government transfers on individual labor supply is illustrated in the lower left panel. If the government spends its excess revenues on consumption, T rs t = 0 there is a clear ranking of the labor-age profiles: the low productivity workers supply more working hours than the medium productivity workers, who in turn work more than the high productivity households. Due to the negative wealth effect, all three profiles decline at age of 30. However, if the government transfers its excess revenues lump-sum to the households, the low productivity workers decrease their labor supply relatively more than the medium productivity workers so that their age profile drops below the profile of the medium productivity workers (see the solid lines). 
Stationary Equilibrium
Fig7
The discontinuous drop in money balances at age s = 161 can be understood by combining the the first-order conditions ( 46d). Evaluated at the stationary equilibrium and rearranged, this gives:
At s = R the decline in taxable income causes a sudden decrease in the marginal tax rate τ ′ (y s+1,h ), which in turn explains the non-monotonic behavior of the money-age profile.
Log-Linearization
The log-linear version of the model set out in the previous subsection is a straight forward extension of the log-linear model considered in Subsection We assume that the money transfer to the first generation is kept fixed at its stationary value so thatm t,1,h = 0 for all h = 1, . . . , m. We addπ t -the percentage deviation of the inflation factor from its stationary value θ -to the vector λ t : λ t := λ t,1,1 , . . . ,λ t,T −1,m ,π t ′ , and include the percentage deviation of aggregate beginning-of-period real money balances M t from its stationary value in the vector u t which is otherwise unchanged. The vector z t now includes the percentage deviation of the level of productivity Z t from its stationary value and the percentage deviation of the growth factor of money supply θ t : The log-linearized first-order conditions with respect to consumption are
From the model of Subsection
The log-linearized first-order conditions with respect to labor supply from ( LL1c 40d) remain valid. The m log-linearized budget constraints of generation T yield:
Also the log-linear equations ( 
50) is
The definition of government expenditures ( GovExp 55) implies:
where we assume that the money transfers to the first generation m t,1,h are kept at their stationary values. Analogously, the linearized equation for aggregate transfers is:
Finally, the log-linearized definition of bequests can be written as:
The dynamic equations of the canonical model ( 
Among the latter, the log-linearized Euler equations ( 
Finally, the log-linearized equation ( A_Mt2 52) is:
Results
Table
Tab4
4 displays the results from simulations of Model 3 for the polar cases ξ = 0 and ξ = 1 and the progressive tax schedule ( A_TF1 29). The numbers in parenthesis are simulation .04) (0.41) (0.88) (0.08) (0.83) results from Model 2. Adding money to the model of Section ELS 4 has almost no impact on the volatility of aggregate output, investment, consumption, labor input, and the real wage. The rate of inflation is noncyclical and not persistent. The increased volatility of the distribution of wealth stems from the variation of individual money holdings. The drastic increase of the standard deviation of the Gini ratio of disposable income can be traced to the volatility of aggregate transfers, which in turn results from seignorage. Assuming a steady supply of money, σ M = 0 reduces this ratio to about the value known from simulations of Model 2. Besides the obvious behavior of the Gini ratio of disposable income the most notable difference between ξ = 0 (government transfers) and ξ = 1 (government consumption) concerns the behavior of private consumption and investment. The volatility of transfers results in a higher standard deviation of private consumption, whereas the volatility of government consumption translates into a higher standard deviation of private investment.
The Representative Agent Version of Model 3
In this model the household solves
The government's budget constraint is
where the rightmost term is seignorage. We continue to assume that government expenditures on goods are a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the government's revenues from taxes and from creating money:
The first-order conditions for the household's problem are:
In the stationary equilibrium of the deterministic version of this model the stock of real money balances M/P is constant. Therefore, the growth factor of rate of money supply θ equals the growth factor of inflation π t := P t /P t−1 . Using λ t = λ t+1 in ( 
60d) implies
In the stationary equilibrium the household's budget constraint reduces to Y t = C t + G t + δK t . Therefore, ( SS4a 61a) and (
GovExpMod3
59) imply
Together with the factor market equilibrium conditions in the stationary equilibrium
the stationary versions of ( Log-linearized at the stationary equilibrium the dynamic model consists of two sets of equations:
and:
where m t := M t /P t−1 .
To match the canonical linear model ( ll1 35), we put: Figure   IMod3 7 displays the response of several variables to a monetary shock of size σ m = 0.0089 in period t = 2 for both the OLG and the RA model. Note that the response is given in percentage points. The increase of the money growth factor by 0.89 percentage points triggers an increase in output of less than 0.0022 percentage points in the OLG model an of less than 0.0005 percentage points in the RA model. The negativ reaction of hours in the OLG model is, again, the result of the labor supply response of the low productivity workers, who decrease their labor supply in response to the increase of their transfer income. Since the high productivity workers increase their labor supply effective labor input increases and accounts for the positive effect of output. 
Price Setting
Prices are set according to the mechanism spelled out in Calvo (1983) . In each period a fraction of (1 − ϕ) of the firms in the intermediate goods sector are allowed to set their relative price P jt /P t optimally. Depending on the assumptions about the information set and the adjustment rule of the remaining fraction of firms we consider three different settings.
1. A purely forward-looking Phillips curve arises if the price setters choose their optimal relative price after the realization of the monetary shock and if the the other firms adjust their price according to
where π denotes the stationary value of the inflation factor in the deterministic version of the model. In terms of percentage deviations from the stationary values the Phillips curve equation is: whereĝ t is the percentage deviation of marginal costs from its stationary value g = (ǫ − 1)/ǫ.
2. If we assume instead that non-optimizing firms set their price according to
the log-linear Phillips curve becomes
3. Finally, if the firms must set their optimal price before the realization of the money supply shock, equation ( A_PK1 65) changes to
Taxes and Pensions
We assume that taxes are collected from nominal income and are imperfectly indexed to inflation. Specifically, the tax schedule is adjusted to the actual price level with a lag of n ∈ {0, 1, . . . } quarters where n = 0 is perfect indexation. In the intermediate quarters nominal income is deflated by P I t := π n P t−n . Accordingly, the tax schedule is now given by where y t,s,h is the market income in units of the final output (wage, capital, and profit income less depreciation of capital) as defined in (
Analogously, pension payments are given by with pens h defined in ( pens 5).
Temporary Equilibria
The imperfect indexation of taxes implies that the households' first-order conditions with respect to labor supply n t,s,h and next-period capital k t+1,s+1,h change from ( 
Except for the definition of taxes and pensions the remaining equations of the model presented in Section
Mod3
5 do not change. Therefore, our Model 4 has the same stationary equilibrium as Model 3.
Log-Linearization
The definitions of the vectors x t and λ t from the canonical linear model ( ll1 35) depend on the Phillips curve equation. In the case of Phillips curves ( A_PK0 64) and ( A_PK1 65), we includê π t andĝ t in the vector λ t , thus:
When we use equation ( A_PK2 66) so thatπ t is a predetermined state variable, we include the auxiliary variablex t :=π t+1 in the vector of costate variables, hence:
In the case of the Phillips curve ( 
the m log-linearized budget constraints of the T -year old households ( LL7b 56b), the loglinearized factor market equilibrium conditions ( FME1 13) with time dependent marginal costs g t ,
the log-linearized equation for aggregate profits (
equations ( 
aggregate transfers,
), and ( LL1f 40o), where GĜ t is now given by GĜ t − ξT ax T ax t − ξBeq Beq t − ξSeignM t = −ξSeignπ t + ξP ens
The dynamic equations consist of ( 
one of the Phillips curve equations (
), and the definitions of the auxiliary variables:
Sensitivity Analysis
Phillips Curves. Table   Tab5 5 provides information on the roles played by the different Phillips curves given in equations ( A_PK0 64)-( A_PK2 66). The summary statistics are from simulations that assume no further nominal rigidities than those present in the Phillips curves, i.e. n = 0. We use a moderate degree of price stickiness. φ = 0.25 implies that prices change about every four month. This is in line with evidence provided by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvstov (2005) .
If prices are set before the monetary shock, (equation ( A_PK2 66)), even for the small value of φ = 0.25, output, investment and hours are unrealistically volatile. For example, the standard deviation of output is equal to 19.81 in this case in our model, while Cooley and Hansen (1995) , Table 7 .1, find a value equal to 1.72 for the US economy. Inflation is less volatile than empirically observed (for the U.S. σ π = 0.57, see Cooley and Hansen (1995) , Table 7 .1.) but displays a high degree of persistence (r π = 0.6). For both the Phillips curves ( Degree of Price Stickiness. Table   Tab6 6 considers increasing degrees of nominal rigidity ϕ in the case of the forward and backward looking Phillips curve ( A_PK1 65). Again, the simulations do not embed imperfect indexation of taxes and pensions. If prices are becoming more sticky, the volatility of output, investment, and hours increases while the volatility of inflation decreases. For ϕ = 0.75, the standard deviations of these variables are unrealistically large. In order to have both a high degree of nominal rigidity and plausible degrees of volatility of major macroeconomic aggregates, one has to introduce frictions into the process of capital accumulation -as, for example, in the representative agent model of Heer and Maußner (2009c) .
Degree of Heterogeneity. Table   Tab7 7 considers the distributional effects if agents within a generation do not differ with respect to productivity. In our model, this is corresponds to m = 1.
The volatility of the Gini ratios of market and disposable income for both ξ = 0 and ξ = 1 is higher than in our benchmark model with m = 3 different types of productivity. This indicates that the redistributive effects between the younger and poorer households on the one hand and the older and richer households on the other hand are partly compensated by the redistribution between the poor and the rich within the same generation.
The Representative Agent Version of Model 4
Using the tax function ( 
